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ABSTRACT   
A moderate M7.1 earthquake hit Canterbury on Saturday, 4 September, 2010 at 04:35:46 a.m. New Zealand time (GMT +12). 
It was expected to be the most damaging ground shake since the 1931 magnitude 7.8 Hawke's Bay earthquake. The epicentre 
was located approximately 45 km west of Christchurch, in a rural area at a depth of 10 km.  There were followed by more 
than thousand aftershocks had been measured. An aftershock M6.3 was recorded at 12:51 pm on Tuesday, 22 February 2011. 
The epicentre of the aftershock was approximately 10 km south-east of the Christchurch Central Business District (CBD), 
near Lyttelton, at a similar depth to the initial earthquake and caused much more severe damage to CBD and residential 
areas nearby. Lessons learned from the Canterbury earthquake and its aftershocks are a timely reminder to Indonesian 
structural engineers of a number of things with respect to seismic design, construction practices and post disaster evaluation. 
These include: The importance of implementing the latest seismic loadings and design technology into new and existing 
structures without undue delay; The need to maintain effective Building Code enforcement and post-earthquake audit process, 
including the keeping of publicly transparent compliance records; The important role of the design engineer in observing and 
auditing the interpretation and implementation of the design; Vigilance to prevent improper substitution of materials and ill-
considered design changes; The importance of ongoing continuing professional development and education for design, 
construction and building code enforcement officials. This paper also discusses the need of having a guide for conducting 
post-earthquake structural repairs as including a quick way to identify appropriate repair strategies.  
KEYWORDS: earthquake, post-earthquake repair, post-earthquake audit process, seismic loadings. 
 
INTRODUCTION   
The garden city of Christchurch is the largest city in 
the South Island of New Zealand, with a population of 
around 376,700 people12.  A moderate M7.1 ground 
shake (known as the Darfield earthquake) struck the east 
of the South Island at 4:35 am on Saturday, 4 September, 
2010. The epicentre was located approximately 45 km 
west of Christchurch, at a depth of 10 km.  There was no 
loss of life in this earthquake and only two serious 
injuries. This was the largest earthquake in New Zealand 
since the deadly M7.8 Hawke's Bay (east of North-Island) 
earthquake in 1931. There were over a thousand 
aftershocks which have been measured. The biggest 
aftershock was recorded at M6.3 at 12:51 pm on Tuesday, 
22 February 2011. This epicentre of the latest aftershock 
was approximately 10 km south-east of the Christchurch 
Central Business District (CBD), near Lyttelton, at a 
similar depth to the initial earthquake (see Fig. 1). The 
damage to CBD buildings and residential areas in the 
eastern part of Christchurch was much greater than that of 
the last 4 September, 2010. Its shallowness, proximity to 
urban centre and the timing of this latest aftershock made 
this ground shake particularly devastating. This 
aftershock caused a death toll of 182 people and many 
people seriously injured as well as severe damage of a 
wide range of modern buildings, RC-buildings pre-1970 
and heritage or older buildings. 
 
SEISMICITY AND GROUND MOTIONS 
New Zealand is located at the tectonic plate boundary 
between the Australian and Pacific Plates which passes 
through the South Island of New Zealand. Subduction at 
the north transitions into a continent-continent collision 
zone as shown in Fig. 2. The Australian and Pacific Plates 
converge obliquely at around 30-60 mm/year in New 
Zealand. The resultant collision zone between these plates 
is not in form of a line on a map, rather it is a distributed 
zone of active faults each with their own capability of 
generating large earthquakes throughout New Zealand. 
It was found that a previously unknown fault had 
caused the earthquake. A fault beneath the Canterbury 
Plains capable of generating an earthquake of that size 
was a major surprise. Building design is based on the NZ 
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Map, which is based on 
anticipated shaking from known faults. A significant 
question arises, about whether design standards should 
take more account of the possibility of such unknown 
faults. 
There were many strong motion testing sites set up 
after the September earthquake that will provided very 
useful information about the earthquake for future 
assessment of seismicity in Christchurch.  However it will 
take some time for the records to be properly calibrated 
and analysed. Fig. 3 and 4 show the preliminary response 
spectra based on recordings in 4 September 2010 and 22 
February 2011, for deep or soft soils, respectively 
compared to the NZS1170 spectra for sites close to the 
Christchurch CBD.   
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GEOTECHNICAL ASPECTS AND 
LIQUEFACTIONS 
The over-riding impression of the main shock is one 
of serious liquefaction damage to homes as well as 
schools and other low rise buildings on soft soils and 
sand. Foundations are tilted, porches and rooms are 
broken away, and floors are pushed up or down and 
separated, leaving doors and walls out of kilter. 
Lateral displacements were measured in urban areas 
affected by lateral spreading during the 2010 main shock. 
Significant offset-right lateral generally ranged between 
0.5 to 3.5 m, with variable vertical throw mostly less than 
1 m in the areas investigated. As a result, a significant 
amount of damage was induced to the residential 
properties/houses and lifelines in these areas10. 
 
BUILDING PERFORMANCES 
New Zealand significantly upgraded its building codes 
for seismic requirements in the 1970s. Buildings 
constructed before these stricter codes were in place 
sustained the most damage. Damage from the main shock 
is mostly restricted to old unreinforced masonry 
buildings, although many survived. Most modern concrete 
and steel buildings, and timber framed houses, had 
minimal structural damage.  
The aftershock in February 2011, however caused 
thousands of buildings to be classified as unsafe, two total 
 
Fig. 1. Map showing the main shock, aftershocks, and fault ruptures5 
 
 
Fig. 2. The tectonic plate boundary in New Zealand region13 
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collapses of CBD buildings, liquefaction in many part of 
the eastern suburbs of the city and CBD, and inelastic 
response in a number of modern buildings. 
Residential Buildings  
Most houses in the vicinity are built using light timber 
framing, others use steel framing, solid wood, brick and 
masonry houses. During the 4 September 2010 
earthquake, thousands of chimneys were claimed to have 
collapsed and resulted in damage of the surrounding roof 
structure (see Fig. 5), neighbouring properties and 
vehicles. Housing damage was typically limited to 
damage from liquefaction and related lateral spreading or 
settlement of foundations.  Houses built in the last twenty 
years that are founded on unreinforced concrete slab on 
grade suffered significant damage where liquefaction 
occurred.  
During the February 2011 aftershock severe structural 
damage of residential buildings occurred. Damage was 
caused by rock fall and also ground movements in the 
hilly Sumner area. Falling chimneys again caused damage 
to roofs. Vertical accelerations of this ground shake 
caused roof material to be shaken off. Further issues were 
damaged veneers, damage to linings, soft storey failures 
(see Fig. 6), lateral shift and subsidence near the river, 
damage to foundations due to liquefaction, slope 
movement and lateral shaking. Other houses constructed 
using steel framing, solid wood, brick and masonry were 
also severely damaged. Most pole houses performed well 
due to their flexibility.  
 
Fig. 3. Comparison of recorded in 4 September 2010 and NZS1170 spectra  
for sites close to the Christchurch CBD8 
 
 
Fig. 4. Comparison of recorded in 22 February 2011 and NZS1170 spectra  
for sites close to the Christchurch CBD. 
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Heritage and Old Buildings 
Recent research has suggested that there are 
approximately 850 unreinforced masonry (URM) 
buildings in the Canterbury area11. Most of these 
buildings consist of 1 or 2 storey and most of them are 
used for commercial occupancy. After the main shock 4 
September 2010, URM buildings in Christchurch that had 
been re-strengthened earlier showed good performance. 
However to the contrary many of the ones that had not 
been strengthened experienced a lot of damage. 
However, after the aftershock 22 February 2011, many 
URM structures, particularly in the Christchurch business 
districts, suffered more damage, and partial collapse due 
to their close proximity to the shaking (see Fig. 7). There 
was also considerable damage to other URM buildings 
which are historic or heritage structures. The Christchurch 
City Council and building owners will have to set 
priorities on which buildings must be saved and which 
may need to be demolished. 
The retrofitted URM buildings basically showed that 
their steel strong back, textile reinforced mortar/shotcrete 
strengthening generally performed well. Reinforced 
concrete masonry (RCM) buildings suffered minor to 
moderate diagonal cracking failures primarily attributable 
to poor or absent grouting and poor rebar detailing. The 
city icon, Christchurch Cathedral which was built with 
stone material in 1881 and strengthened in 1997 has 
severely damaged. 
 
Multi Storey Buildings 
Based on the Building Safety Evaluation Statistics 
made after the 4 September 2010 event, it was found that 
in spite of non structural damage (facade, glazing, infills, 
partitions, ceilings, contents) around 90% of pre-1970s 
and post-1970s multistorey buildings had performed well. 
These buildings were constructed with various types of 
earthquake resistant structural systems, such as 
Reinforced Concrete (RC) Frames, RC Shear Walls, RC 
Frames with Masonry Infills. Pre-1970s RC buildings 
 
Fig. 5. Collapsed chimney of residential housing 
 
 
Fig. 6. Soft storey failure of timber housing 
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showed signs of early brittle failure modes, such as beam-
column joint cracks and onset of infill wall failures. 
Several high-rise buildings showed low-to-moderate level 
of damage, consistent with the long-period demand of the 
ground shake.  
The 22 February 2011 aftershock, however caused an 
early 1960’s and a late 1980’s RC buildings to totally 
collapse (PGC and CTV Buildings). There were also 
found among both pre- and post-1970s RC buildings: 
beam plastic hinges and slab damage; beam shear failures; 
short column failures at building setback level; punching 
shear of RC flat slabs; multiple shear failures at columns 
(see Fig. 8); cracks in beam-column joints; foundation 
beam failures; buckled boundary reinforcing bars; shear 
or flexural damage in columns and walls.  
Construction of modern steel buildings in 
Christchurch generally performed well after the main 
shock and also the aftershock 22 February 2011. 
However, one eccentrically braced frames developed link 
fractures due to poor detailing; concentrically braced 
frames fractures were observed in connections unable to 
develop the brace gross-section yield strength; and 
multiple industrial steel storage racks collapsed.  
In precast concrete buildings, there were beam 
elongation and precast floors damages; welded slotted 
connection failures due to workmanship errors; anchorage 
pull out failures; loss of bearing support/shear transfer; 
collapsed precast stairs, etc.  As expected the base 
isolated Christchurch hospital only experienced minimal 
damage and remained operational. 
 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND COORDINATION 
The emergency responses after both the 4 September 
2010 as well as the 22 February 2011 events were 
effective.  Well planned arrangements were set-up across 
local authorities, lifeline utility operators, engineering 
consultancies, and national agencies. Christchurch City, 
and Waimakariri and Selwyn Districts, all declared a 
State of Local Emergency for their districts under the 
Civil Defense Emergency Management Act 20028. The 
Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams immediately 
commenced rescue operations. The search and rescue 
 
Fig. 7. Three storey URM building in the CBD severely damaged 
 
  
Fig. 8. Shear failure column at post-1970 RC building 
 
 
56 © ITS JOURNAL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING / Vol. 31 No. 2/ November 2011  
operation officially ended nine days after the 22 February 
2011 aftershock and they then moved their focus from 
rescue to recovery, once the probability of finding 
survivors was gone. 
Building assessments began within 12 hours after the 
shocks, using the “Building Safety Evaluation during a 
State of Emergency” process refined during the 2009 
NZSEE mission to Padang, Indonesia1. The building 
inspection teams involving professional structural 
engineers and building officials were divided into several 
operations. One operation focused on the residential 
suburbs while another operation focused on the 
commercial/residential buildings within the Christchurch 
Central Business District (CBD).  Level 1 Rapid 
Assessment (placarding) of the CBD area started on the 
fourth day and some private engineering consultancies 
were tasked to carry out Level 2 Assessment of specific 
buildings where they had an existing client-consultancy 
relationship. 
Physical and virtual clearing houses were established 
after the earthquakes by the Natural Hazards Research 
Platform (for registered users), NZSEE (for both public 
and for registered users), AEES, and EERI., in the first 
few weeks comprised an impressive collaboration and 
free exchange of information between scientists, 
engineers, government officials, and International visitors. 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
The M7.1 main shock and also M6.3 aftershock which hit 
Canterbury area in a 5 month period of time is a punctual 
reminder to Indonesian structural engineers of a number 
of things with respect to seismic design and construction 
practice of structures. These include: 
a. The importance of implementing the latest seismic 
loadings and design technology into new structures 
and existing essential buildings without undue delay. 
Non-ductile detailing, for instance can be 
catastrophic and must therefore be retrofitted. So-
called gravity only elements do not exist in reality. 
They need to be design to accommodate the inelastic 
displacements developed in the buildings primary 
seismic resisting system. Precast concrete 
connections are critical and therefore need to be 
designed and implemented with extreme care.  
b. It is important to the community who occupy 
buildings for the authorities to maintain an effective 
Building Code enforcement and audit process, 
including the keeping of publicly transparent 
compliance records.  Good seismic resisting 
structures require good design, good materials, and 
good construction. Therefore the role of the design 
engineer in observing and auditing the interpretation 
and implementation of the design is essential, to 
prevent improper substitution of materials and ill-
considered design changes during construction. 
c. There is an urgent need for ongoing continuing 
professional development and education for 
designers, construction engineers and building code 
enforcement officials, to develop and maintain their 
technical competency.  
d. There is an urgent need to develop a guide for 
conducting post-earthquake structural assessments 
and repairs, including a quick way to identify 
appropriate repair strategies.  
e. It is important to urgently implement effective and 
cooperative emergency response schemes involving 
all relevant agencies. Seismic drills for response 
agencies need to occur regularly. 
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